Published pursuant to clause 27 of Practice Note SC CA 1
28 September 2026
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – on 21 September 2021, the first respondent was injured while working at a childcare centre in the course of her employment with the appellant – the first respondent subsequently made a claim for lump sum compensation pursuant to s 66 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) – the appellant accepted liability for the injury but disputed the degree of whole person impairment (WPI) suffered by the first respondent – the first respondent and the appellant each retained medical specialists to assess the first respondent’s WPI; the specialists made assessments of 43% and 25% WPI, respectively – on 26 August 2024, the first respondent filed an Application to Resolve a Dispute in the Personal Injury Commission (PIC) – pursuant to s 321 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (NSW) (the 1998 Act), the PIC referred the dispute for assessment by a Medical Assessor who examined the first respondent and, on 29 October 2024, made a WPI assessment of 31% and issued a Medical Assessment Certificate to that effect – on 28 November 2024, the appellant filed an appeal against the Certificate – on 5 February 2025, a delegate of the President of the PIC referred the appeal to an Appeal Panel – on 18 March 2025, the Appeal Panel confirmed the correctness of the Certificate and dismissed the appeal – on 17 June 2025, the appellant commenced proceedings seeking judicial review of the Appeal Panel’s decision – the appellant alleged that the Appeal Panel committed an error of law in mischaracterising the nature of the “medical dispute” between the appellant and the first respondent, thereby misapplying s 319 of the 1998 Act – the appellant further alleged that the second respondent made a jurisdictional error by failing to limit its assessment to the “medical dispute” between the appellant and first respondent as defined in s 319 – the appellant contended that the Medical Assessor and the Appeal Panel had considered an injury to the first respondent’s right knee despite there being no “medical dispute” with respect to any knee injury – the first respondent contended that the “medical dispute” was about the competing WPI assessments of 43% and 25%, and that injury to the right lower extremity was always a part of the first respondent’s case – the primary judge accepted the first respondent’s argument and dismissed the summons – whether the primary judge erred in identifying the relevant “medical dispute” for the purpose of s 321 of the 1998 Act and in making various other findings – whether the primary judge failed to take into account relevant matters.
JTE Enterprises Pty Ltd t/as Mount Gibraltar Preschool v Brown [2025] NSWSC 1502
29 September 2026
CORPORATIONS – in 2021, Hudson Global Resources (Aust) Pty Limited (Hudson) and Scottish Pacific Business Finance Pty Ltd (ScotPac) entered into an invoice financing facility, under which ScotPac agreed to advance to Hudson a percentage of the face value of its receivables after invoices had been issued to customers, in exchange for certain fees and charges and the assignment of all rights and titles to Hudson’s receivables (facility agreement) – on 30 March 2026, a notice was issued under s 260-5 of Sch 1 to the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) requiring ScotPac to remit to the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation 20% of all drawdowns by Hudson under the facility agreement, up to a total amount of $19,640,965.92 (ATO Notice) – on 22 April 2026, Glenn Livingstone, Nick Charlwood and Benjamin Ho were appointed voluntary administrators of Hudson pursuant to s 436A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – on 23 April 2026, the administrators requested the Commissioner to withdraw the ATO Notice, which the Commissioner has not agreed to – on 29 April 2026, the administrators and ScotPac amended the facility agreement, the result of which ScotPac remitted $636,068.92 and $168,133.00 to the Commissioner on 29 and 30 April 2026 respectively – on 6 May 2026, the administrators commenced proceedings against the Commissioner seeking various orders, including an order pursuant to s 447A of the Corporations Act modifying the operation of Pt 5.3A of that Act in relation to Hudson. The order effectively sought to suspend the operation of the ATO Notice during Hudson’s voluntary administration – the primary judge held that s 447A of the Corporations Act conferred power to make the order sought – the primary judge found that the relief sought “directly concerns” how Pt 5.3A of the Corporations Act “is to operate in relation to Hudson”, and that the alteration that would occur to the Commissioner’s statutory rights under Div 260 of Sch 1 to the Taxation Administration Act was “incidental” to promoting the objects of Pt 5.3A – on 18 May 2026, the primary judge made orders giving effect to his Honour’s reasons – whether the primary judge erred in concluding that the order made and entered on 18 May 2026 was authorised by s 447A of the Corporations Act – whether the primary judge erred in his Honour’s characterisation of the relief sought by the voluntary administrators – whether the primary judge erred in not reading down s 447A so that it could operate “concurrently” with Div 260 of Sch 1 to the Taxation Administration Act – whether the primary judge erred in the exercise of his Honour’s discretion by: (1) failing to take into account a material consideration; (2) failing to give sufficient, or any, weight to the effect of the order on the Commissioner’s statutory collection right; and (3) failing to give adequate consideration to certain matters.
In the matter of Hudson Global Resources (Aust) Pty Limited [2026] NSWSC 535
Submissions
29 September 2026
PROCEDURE – the applicant seeks leave to appeal from orders of Garling J dismissing the applicant’s claim for “[j]udicial misconduct, [a]buse of process, [c]riminal conspiracy, [m]alicious prosecution], [and] [f]alse imprisonment”. The applicant alleges that the primary judge erred by: (1) approaching the matter with a predetermined closed mind, thereby denying the applicant procedural fairness; (2) failing to determine the evidentiary substance of the allegations of transcript tampering and doctored video; (3) treating the matter as a pleading failure rather than determining whether the material was capable of supporting an arguable claim; and (4) refusing the applicant’s application for leave to replead.
Gillies v State of New South Wales (No 6) [2025] NSWSC 1534
Gillies v State of New South Wales (No 6) [2025] NSWSC 1534
30 September 2026
CORPORATIONS – in 2019, the first respondent/cross-appellant (Octet) granted an unsecured credit facility (the Octet Facility) to Mrs Mac’s Pty Ltd (Mrs Mac’s), a pie manufacturer – by the second half of 2021, Mrs Mac’s was in financial distress – on 30 September 2022, it agreed to an asset sale to Aus Pie Co Pty Ltd, a company associated with United Petroleum Pty Ltd (the owner of the Pie Face business) – the sale completed on 4 November 2022 and Mrs Mac’s was placed into liquidation on 9 November 2022 – Octet received no return from the winding up, consequent on Westpac, as a first-ranking major secured creditor of Mrs Mac’s, being paid in full out of the proceeds of the sale – Octet commenced proceedings against the applicant/cross-respondent (Mr Markwart), the CFO and company secretary of Mrs Mac’s, and the second to seventh respondents, Mrs Mac’s’ directors, alleging that during 2022, they represented to Octet that Mrs Mac’s was merely pursuing a “recapitalisation” which would ensure that the outstanding balance of the Octet Facility was paid in full – Octet also alleged that in September 2022, when the asset sale became the most likely outcome, Mr Markwart and the directors of Mrs Mac’s remained silent about the change in circumstances, despite the fact that the sale would almost certainly result in Mrs Mac’s’ insolvency – Octet alleged that this conduct was misleading or deceptive and unconscionable contrary to ss 18 and 21 of the Australian Consumer Law, and resulted in Octet’s loss of $3,999,842.69, being the entire balance of the Octet Facility that had been drawn down and not repaid as at 8 November 2022 – the primary judge held that: (1) Mr Markwart engaged in deceptive or misleading conduct in failing in September 2022 to correct representations he had previously made to Octet about Mrs Mac’s financial trajectory; (2) Octet relied on that conduct and consequently incurred a loss of $75,558.92 (being the difference between the Octet Facility balance on 23 September 2022, the day after Mr Markwart discovered the detail of the Pie Face transaction, and the closing balance); (3) Mrs Mac’s’ directors were not personally responsible for the impugned conduct of Mr Markwart as their agent, nor were they knowingly involved in Mr Markwart’s misleading or deceptive conduct; and (4) Mrs Mac’s was a concurrent wrongdoer pursuant to s 87CB(1) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) responsible for 50% of Octet’s loss – the primary judge gave judgment for Octet against Mr Markwart for $37,779.46 plus pre-judgment interest and ordered that Mr Markwart pay 25% of Octet’s costs on the ordinary basis – whether the primary judge erred in holding: (1) that Mr Markwart had engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct; (2) that Mrs Mac’s was responsible for only 50% of Octet’s loss; and (3) that Mr Markwart should pay 25% of Octet’s costs – on Octet’s cross-appeal, whether the primary judge erred in his findings as to Octet’s loss and apportionment of liability to Mrs Mac’s.
Octet Finance Pty Ltd v Macgregor [2026] NSWSC 103
Submissions
30 September
2026/00322890
CORPORATIONS – Tahmoor Coal Pty Ltd (in liq) (Tahmoor) operates an underground coal mine located near Bargo, New South Wales (Tahmoor Mine) – on or around 20 April 2018, Tahmoor and Bargo Collieries Pty Ltd (collectively, the Companies) entered into a royalty deed with Glencore Coal Pty Ltd (Glencore), under which Tahmoor would pay Glencore a royalty on coal that it extracted from the Tahmoor Mine (Royalty Deed) – cl 5.1(a) of the Royalty Deed provided that the Companies must not, without the prior written consent of Glencore, “assign, novate, transfer, charge, encumber, create an interest in or over, or otherwise deal with their rights, title or interest in, or obligations with respect to” certain tenements and land, including tenements associated with the Tahmoor Mine – on 6 March 2026, the Companies entered liquidation, with Messrs Shaun Fraser and Jonathan Henry appointed as their liquidators (the Liquidators) – following the Companies’ entry into liquidation, the Tahmoor Mine was placed into the care and maintenance of the Liquidators – the Liquidators thereafter commenced a sale process in respect of the Tahmoor Mine as a going concern – on 2 April 2026, Glencore wrote to the Liquidators asserting its rights in respect of any breach of the Royalty Deed – on 1 May 2026, the Liquidators wrote to Glencore contending that the continuation of the Royalty Deed was contrary to the interests of the Companies’ creditors and was thus liable to be disclaimed – on 15 May 2026, the Liquidators and the Companies commenced proceedings seeking, amongst other things, a declaration that the Royalty Deed was an “unprofitable contract” within the meaning of s 568(1A) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act) or, alternatively, an order under that section granting the Liquidators and the Companies leave to disclaim the Royalty Deed – on 20 May 2026, following the commencement of proceedings, Glencore gave the Liquidators “pre-emptive consent” under cl 5.1 of the Royalty Deed for the acquisition of the Tahmoor Mine by a purchaser approved by the Liquidators – the primary judge relevantly held that the Royalty Deed was not an “unprofitable contract” because Glencore’s pre-emptive consent obviated any adverse consequences arising from compliance with the terms of the Royalty Deed – the primary judge further refused leave to the Liquidators to disclaim the Royalty Deed under s 568(1A) of the Corporations Act on the basis that a grant of leave would “defeat the rights that Glencore obtained in a proper commercial transaction”, would “potentially undermine commercial certainty in royalty arrangements”, and would constitute a “wealth transfer from Glencore to unsecured creditors” – whether the primary judge erred in failing to find that the Royalty Deed was an “unprofitable contract” within the meaning of s 568(1A) of the Corporations Act – whether the primary judge erred in refusing to grant the Liquidators leave to disclaim the Royalty Deed.
In the matter of Tahmoor Coal Pty Ltd (in liq) [2026] NSWSC 773
1 October 2026
TORTS (negligence) – by a statement of claim (later amended) filed on 16 September 2022, the appellant commenced proceedings against the respondent seeking damages for injury he suffered consequent to sexual assaults committed on him while he was a detainee in a juvenile detention centre (Mount Penang) on the Central Coast between 6 November 1996 and 10 January 1997 – the appellant alleged that the abuse occurred in and around a shower block attached to the detention centre gym – the claim was brought on the basis of three causes of action: in negligence, on the basis that the respondent breached its duty of care to avoid foreseeable but not insignificant risks of harm to the appellant; a non-delegable duty of care owed to the appellant by the respondent; and the vicarious liability of the respondent for the alleged abuse of the appellant – the respondent denied that any abuse had occurred as pleaded – the appellant’s case relied primarily on the evidence of the appellant given at trial – the primary judge found that the appellant did not establish that the pleaded abuse occurred and his Honour therefore dismissed the amended statement of claim – whether the primary judge engaged in an erroneous “methodology of fact-finding” and made various errors in the fact-finding exercise – whether the primary judge failed to give adequate reasons or failed to determine a “foundational fact” – whether the primary judge misapprehended or mischaracterised the appellant’s submissions.
Stanley v State of New South Wales [2025] NSWSC 1460
File number | Case name | Hearing date |
|---|---|---|
| 2026/00128746 | SmartChannel Pty Ltd v Area Ten Pty Ltd | 25/09/2026 |
| 2026/00109693 | Denise Hurley v Tweed Shire Council | 25/09/2026 |
| 2025/00396449 | FX Group Holdings Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Company Limited as trustee of the CPEC 8 Trust A (formerly the Champ IV Trust A) | 22/09/2026 |
| 2026/00134422 | SoClean Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue | 11/9/2026 |
| 2026/00113709 | Secretary, Department of Planning, Housing and Infrastructure v Andrew Thaler | 10/9/2026 |
| 2026/00205816 | Studio B Hair Design Trust v Kerrisons Legal Service | 8/9/2026 |
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