Published pursuant to clause 27 of Practice Note SC CA 1
2026/00154227
Monday, 12 October 2026
COSTS – the respondents are the executors of the estate of the late Blanche Condon, who died on 13 December 2016 – the appellant resides in the United Kingdom and is a nephew of the deceased – on 30 January 2020, the respondents were granted probate in solemn form of the will of the deceased dated 22 November 2016 after a contested hearing in which the appellant challenged the validity of the will – the appellant was ordered to pay the respondents’ costs of the trial proceedings and the costs of an unsuccessful appeal by him to this Court – various contests between the appellant and the respondents ensued as to enforcement of the cost orders – on 14 October 2021, the respondents registered the costs judgments against the appellant in the High Court of Justice in London pursuant to the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 (UK) – in enforcement proceedings in the High Court of Justice, the respondents have been largely successful, with that Court making charging orders over two properties in favour of the respondents, securing an amount of £577,240.67 (as at 28 October 2025) plus daily interest of £117.67 – on the date of the primary judge’s decision, the total amount owing to the respondents and secured by the charging orders was £625,994 – on 20 October 2025, the appellant commenced proceedings in the NSW Supreme Court seeking an order for the revocation of the grant of probate in solemn form and, in lieu thereof, a grant of letters of administration in respect of the deceased’s estate in favour of a suitable person on the basis that the deceased revoked the will the day after it had been executed – on 9 December 2025, the respondents sought orders that the appellant provide security for their costs in the proceedings in the sum of $253,000, that the proceedings be stayed until security was provided, and that the respondents have liberty to apply to have the proceedings dismissed if the security was not provided within 28 days of the order – the primary judge held that an order for security was necessary to protect the efficacy of the Court’s jurisdiction to award costs by addressing the real risk to the respondents that the registration and enforcement in the United Kingdom of any costs judgment in the proceedings against the appellant would be a long, complex and costly process – the primary judge therefore made the orders sought by the respondents – whether the primary judge erred in ordering the appellant to provide security for costs.
Decision under appeal
Battenberg v Phillips [2026] NSWSC 292
Coram
Counsel
2026/00013733
Tuesday, 13 October 2026
SUCCESSION – Mr Geoffrey Baxter (the deceased) died intestate on 1 August 2023 – on 16 May 2025, the appellant, a sister of the deceased, was granted letters of administration in respect of the estate of the deceased – the respondent commence proceedings seeking provision for her maintenance, education or advancement in life pursuant to s 59 of the Succession Act 2006 (NSW) out of the estate of the deceased – it was agreed that the respondent and the deceased had a relationship but the nature, longevity and extent of the relationship was disputed – the respondent and the deceased were living apart when the deceased died and the respondent did not learn of his death for six weeks, but the respondent maintained that she still considered the deceased to be her de facto spouse and long-term partner at the time of his death – the appellant contended that the relationship had ended by the time of the deceased’s death – the primary judge found that, while the relationship between the deceased and the respondent was tumultuous, the respondent was the person to whom the deceased was closest for the final decade of his life and that the respondent and the deceased were for many periods of time members of the same household and dependent on each other – the primary judge further found that the respondent’s financial position was poor and her needs great – the primary judge held that under s 59, the respondent was an eligible person, that there were factors warranting the making of her application, and that a family provision order should be made in her favour as she was that only person to whom the deceased owed a moral duty to make provision – whether the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent was partly dependant on the deceased and that there were factors warranting the making of the application – whether the primary judge erred in principle by conflating the concepts of the respondent being the “love of [the deceased’s] life” and the existence of a “connection that kept bringing [the deceased and the respondent] together” as partners with a moral or social obligation to make provision for the respondent, and by ultimately holding that the respondent was a person to whom the deceased owed any moral duty – whether the primary judge erred in making the provision for the respondent that his Honour did.
Decision under appeal
Robinson v Glennon [2025] NSWSC 770
Coram
Counsel
2025/00373479
Thursday, 15 October 2026
PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE (medical) – the appellant attended upon the respondent following a course of conservative treatment to her lower back which commenced in 1995 – on 11 March 1999, the respondent performed surgery on the appellant and attended upon her thereafter on several occasions again in 1999 – the appellant alleged that she experienced symptoms of lower back injuries in the years following the surgery – the appellant alleged that the respondent negligently advised and managed the appellant over the period in which he treated her in 1999 – the primary judge dismissed the appellant’s claim, including by not granting an extension of the 3-year limitation period – whether the primary judge erred in failing to find that the respondent breached his duty of care to the appellant with respect to medical advice given including regarding pre-operation advice of the risks of surgery – whether the primary judge erred in failing to find that the respondent breached his duty of care in respect of advice regarding the appellant’s return to playing hockey post-operatively – whether the primary judge erred in rejecting the appellant’s accounts of back pain commencing in 2004 – whether the primary judge erred in failing to find that, but for the respondent’s negligent advice, the appellant would not have had the surgery and would not have returned to playing hockey until a reasonable time had elapsed, or at all – whether the primary judge erred in not granting an extension of the limitation period.
Decision under appeal
Briggs v Hillier [2025] NSWSC 1021
Submissions
Coram
Counsel
Case information
2025/00491158
6 October 2026
Catchwords
PROCEDURE – on 24 December 2020, the first respondent commenced proceedings by Summons seeking interim relief and final relief against several related companies in respect of alleged tax liabilities – the appellant was the sole director of several of the defendant companies – on or around 1 September 2023, the first respondent entered into a settlement deed with the appellant and several of the defendant companies who were associated with the third respondent (the Gazal Parties) which provided that each of the Gazal Parties would be jointly and severally liable to the first respondent for $18 million (the settlement sum) – the settlement deed further provided that in the event of default by the Gazal Parties, the Gazal Parties agreed that the first respondent would be entitled to judgment against them in the amount of the settlement sum less any payments already made to the first respondent pursuant to the settlement deed – by Notice of Motion filed on 18 April 2024 the first respondent sought orders under r 36.1A of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR) that judgment be entered for the first respondent jointly and severally against the Gazal Parties in the amount of $17,357,593.94 (the settlement sum less payments already made under the settlement deed) on the basis that the Gazal Parties were in default under the settlement deed – the appellant sought an adjournment of the application for judgment against him on the basis that he wished his newly retained legal representatives to investigate the possibility that the settlement deed was void or unenforceable on various bases, and the opportunity to adduce evidence in support of that contention – the primary judge found that the Gazal Parties were in default under the settlement deed – the primary judge dismissed the appellant’s application for an adjournment on the basis that the appellant had led no evidence which might provide a basis for the investigation into the unenforceability of the settlement deed – the primary judge held that the first respondent had complied with the terms of the settlement deed so as to entitle the first respondent to judgment in the amount of $17,357,593.94 plus costs – whether the primary judge erred in dismissing the adjournment application – whether the primary judge erred in entering judgment against the appellant for $17,357,593.94 plus costs without considering the evidence the appellant sought to adduce if the adjournment had been granted.
Decision under appeal
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Westmeat Development Pty Ltd as trustee for Westmeat Development Trust [2024] NSWSC 548
Submissions
Coram
Counsel
Case information
2025/00496774
7 October
Catchwords
PROCEDURE – on 8 August 2023, the appellant commenced proceedings claiming damages in no specified amount for wrongful arrest, false imprisonment trespass to land and malicious prosecution relating to his arrest by police officers in Rockdale on 25 June 2018 – the matter was heard jointly with related proceedings instituted by the appellant’s son (Mr Tabbaa Junior), arising from much of the same factual circumstances – the appellant and Mr Tabbaa Junior were unrepresented at trial – after opening their cases on 25 August 2025, each ofthe appellant and Mr Tabbaa Junior was invited to enter the witness box to give evidence in support of their claims – they both refused to do so – the matter was stood over to the following day to allow the respondent to reconsider its position – on the following morning, the respondent sought and was granted leave to file a notice of motion seeking judgment for want of evidence in its favour in relation to the malicious prosecution and trespass to land claims pursuant to r 29.10 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) on the basis that the appellant and Mr Tabbaa Junior had closed their cases and there was no case to answer – the appellant and Mr Tabbaa junior resisted the proposition that their cases were closed and requested an adjournment for a day during which to consider their position, which the primary judge granted – on 27 August 2025, the respondent moved on its motion – in an ex-tempore judgment, the primary judge held that the appellant and Mr Tabbaa Junior had closed their cases on 25 August 2025 – the primary judge further held that the appellant and Mr Tabbaa Junior bore the onus of making out their claims in malicious prosecution and trespass to land, and in the absence of evidence lead by the appellant or Mr Tabbaa Junior in support of those claims, they could not conceivably be made out – the primary judge granted the relief sought in the motion, giving judgment in favour of the respondent for want of evidence on the appellant and Mr Tabbaa Junior’s claims in malicious prosecution and trespass to land pursuant to UCPR r 29.10 – whether the primary judge erred in law by failing to afford procedural fairness to the appellant by failing to consider or properly engage with the appellant’s submissions – whether the primary judge erred in finding that the appellant had closed his case – whether the primary judge failed to afford procedural fairness, failed to provide adequate reasons or acted in bad faith in granting the relief sought in the respondent’s notice of motion.
Decision under appeal
Mouhammad Riad Tabbaa v State of New South Wales (Weber SC DCJ 27/8/2025; 28/11/2025
Submissions
Coram
Counsel
Case information
2026/00097254
8 October 2026
Catchwords
BUILDING & CONSTRUCTION – on 22 September 2016, the appellant entered into a written contract with the respondents to perform residential building works in the form of renovations and additions to the respondents’ property located at East Street, Blakehurst – the respondents paid $714,674 to the appellant for the building works, which commenced in October 2016 – on 26 February 2019, the respondents terminated the contract as a result of the appellant’s delay in completing the building works – on 15 February 2019, the respondents commenced proceedings against the appellant in the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal seeking damages for breach of contract – the appellant did not dispute that he was in breach of the contract and that the respondents were entitled to terminate the contract, but disputed the calculation of damages – on 8 July 2020, the Tribunal awarded the respondents $317,919 in damages against the appellant for breach of contract – the appellant was subsequently unsuccessful in an appeal to the Appeal Panel against the Tribunal’s decision, but was successful in an appeal to the Supreme Court which, on 5 October 2022, allowed the appeal on the ground of apprehended bias and remitted the matter to the Tribunal for redetermination – before the Tribunal, in addition to resisting the respondents’ claim for damages, the appellant advanced a quantum meruit claim in the amount of $34,675 – on 29 August 2024, the Tribunal (differently constituted) ordered the appellant to pay the respondents $416,508.40 plus the respondents’ costs, and found that the appellant had failed to establish his quantum meruit claim – on 25 September 2024, the appellant appealed to the Appeal Panel which, on 11 June 2025, allowed the appellant’s appeal in part, decreased the amount payable to the respondents to $372,579.42, and ordered the appellant to pay 90% of the respondents’ costs of the appeal on an ordinary basis – the appellant sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the Appeal Panel’s decision in relation to the quantum meruit claim, the construction of the contract, and costs – the primary judge refused to grant leave to appeal on all grounds – whether the primary judge erred in refusing to grant leave to appeal and in failing to find error in the Appeal Panel’s decision in relation to the construction of the contract.
Decision under appeal
DeMarco v Macey [2026] NSWSC 57
Submissions
Coram
Counsel
28 September 2026
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – on 21 September 2021, the first respondent was injured while working at a childcare centre in the course of her employment with the appellant – the first respondent subsequently made a claim for lump sum compensation pursuant to s 66 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) – the appellant accepted liability for the injury but disputed the degree of whole person impairment (WPI) suffered by the first respondent – the first respondent and the appellant each retained medical specialists to assess the first respondent’s WPI; the specialists made assessments of 43% and 25% WPI, respectively – on 26 August 2024, the first respondent filed an Application to Resolve a Dispute in the Personal Injury Commission (PIC) – pursuant to s 321 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (NSW) (the 1998 Act), the PIC referred the dispute for assessment by a Medical Assessor who examined the first respondent and, on 29 October 2024, made a WPI assessment of 31% and issued a Medical Assessment Certificate to that effect – on 28 November 2024, the appellant filed an appeal against the Certificate – on 5 February 2025, a delegate of the President of the PIC referred the appeal to an Appeal Panel – on 18 March 2025, the Appeal Panel confirmed the correctness of the Certificate and dismissed the appeal – on 17 June 2025, the appellant commenced proceedings seeking judicial review of the Appeal Panel’s decision – the appellant alleged that the Appeal Panel committed an error of law in mischaracterising the nature of the “medical dispute” between the appellant and the first respondent, thereby misapplying s 319 of the 1998 Act – the appellant further alleged that the second respondent made a jurisdictional error by failing to limit its assessment to the “medical dispute” between the appellant and first respondent as defined in s 319 – the appellant contended that the Medical Assessor and the Appeal Panel had considered an injury to the first respondent’s right knee despite there being no “medical dispute” with respect to any knee injury – the first respondent contended that the “medical dispute” was about the competing WPI assessments of 43% and 25%, and that injury to the right lower extremity was always a part of the first respondent’s case – the primary judge accepted the first respondent’s argument and dismissed the summons – whether the primary judge erred in identifying the relevant “medical dispute” for the purpose of s 321 of the 1998 Act and in making various other findings – whether the primary judge failed to take into account relevant matters.
JTE Enterprises Pty Ltd t/as Mount Gibraltar Preschool v Brown [2025] NSWSC 1502
29 September 2026
CORPORATIONS – in 2021, Hudson Global Resources (Aust) Pty Limited (Hudson) and Scottish Pacific Business Finance Pty Ltd (ScotPac) entered into an invoice financing facility, under which ScotPac agreed to advance to Hudson a percentage of the face value of its receivables after invoices had been issued to customers, in exchange for certain fees and charges and the assignment of all rights and titles to Hudson’s receivables (facility agreement) – on 30 March 2026, a notice was issued under s 260-5 of Sch 1 to the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) requiring ScotPac to remit to the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation 20% of all drawdowns by Hudson under the facility agreement, up to a total amount of $19,640,965.92 (ATO Notice) – on 22 April 2026, Glenn Livingstone, Nick Charlwood and Benjamin Ho were appointed voluntary administrators of Hudson pursuant to s 436A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – on 23 April 2026, the administrators requested the Commissioner to withdraw the ATO Notice, which the Commissioner has not agreed to – on 29 April 2026, the administrators and ScotPac amended the facility agreement, the result of which ScotPac remitted $636,068.92 and $168,133.00 to the Commissioner on 29 and 30 April 2026 respectively – on 6 May 2026, the administrators commenced proceedings against the Commissioner seeking various orders, including an order pursuant to s 447A of the Corporations Act modifying the operation of Pt 5.3A of that Act in relation to Hudson. The order effectively sought to suspend the operation of the ATO Notice during Hudson’s voluntary administration – the primary judge held that s 447A of the Corporations Act conferred power to make the order sought – the primary judge found that the relief sought “directly concerns” how Pt 5.3A of the Corporations Act “is to operate in relation to Hudson”, and that the alteration that would occur to the Commissioner’s statutory rights under Div 260 of Sch 1 to the Taxation Administration Act was “incidental” to promoting the objects of Pt 5.3A – on 18 May 2026, the primary judge made orders giving effect to his Honour’s reasons – whether the primary judge erred in concluding that the order made and entered on 18 May 2026 was authorised by s 447A of the Corporations Act – whether the primary judge erred in his Honour’s characterisation of the relief sought by the voluntary administrators – whether the primary judge erred in not reading down s 447A so that it could operate “concurrently” with Div 260 of Sch 1 to the Taxation Administration Act – whether the primary judge erred in the exercise of his Honour’s discretion by: (1) failing to take into account a material consideration; (2) failing to give sufficient, or any, weight to the effect of the order on the Commissioner’s statutory collection right; and (3) failing to give adequate consideration to certain matters.
In the matter of Hudson Global Resources (Aust) Pty Limited [2026] NSWSC 535
Submissions
29 September 2026
PROCEDURE – the applicant seeks leave to appeal from orders of Garling J dismissing the applicant’s claim for “[j]udicial misconduct, [a]buse of process, [c]riminal conspiracy, [m]alicious prosecution], [and] [f]alse imprisonment”. The applicant alleges that the primary judge erred by: (1) approaching the matter with a predetermined closed mind, thereby denying the applicant procedural fairness; (2) failing to determine the evidentiary substance of the allegations of transcript tampering and doctored video; (3) treating the matter as a pleading failure rather than determining whether the material was capable of supporting an arguable claim; and (4) refusing the applicant’s application for leave to replead.
Gillies v State of New South Wales (No 6) [2025] NSWSC 1534
Gillies v State of New South Wales (No 6) [2025] NSWSC 1534
30 September 2026
CORPORATIONS – in 2019, the first respondent/cross-appellant (Octet) granted an unsecured credit facility (the Octet Facility) to Mrs Mac’s Pty Ltd (Mrs Mac’s), a pie manufacturer – by the second half of 2021, Mrs Mac’s was in financial distress – on 30 September 2022, it agreed to an asset sale to Aus Pie Co Pty Ltd, a company associated with United Petroleum Pty Ltd (the owner of the Pie Face business) – the sale completed on 4 November 2022 and Mrs Mac’s was placed into liquidation on 9 November 2022 – Octet received no return from the winding up, consequent on Westpac, as a first-ranking major secured creditor of Mrs Mac’s, being paid in full out of the proceeds of the sale – Octet commenced proceedings against the applicant/cross-respondent (Mr Markwart), the CFO and company secretary of Mrs Mac’s, and the second to seventh respondents, Mrs Mac’s’ directors, alleging that during 2022, they represented to Octet that Mrs Mac’s was merely pursuing a “recapitalisation” which would ensure that the outstanding balance of the Octet Facility was paid in full – Octet also alleged that in September 2022, when the asset sale became the most likely outcome, Mr Markwart and the directors of Mrs Mac’s remained silent about the change in circumstances, despite the fact that the sale would almost certainly result in Mrs Mac’s’ insolvency – Octet alleged that this conduct was misleading or deceptive and unconscionable contrary to ss 18 and 21 of the Australian Consumer Law, and resulted in Octet’s loss of $3,999,842.69, being the entire balance of the Octet Facility that had been drawn down and not repaid as at 8 November 2022 – the primary judge held that: (1) Mr Markwart engaged in deceptive or misleading conduct in failing in September 2022 to correct representations he had previously made to Octet about Mrs Mac’s financial trajectory; (2) Octet relied on that conduct and consequently incurred a loss of $75,558.92 (being the difference between the Octet Facility balance on 23 September 2022, the day after Mr Markwart discovered the detail of the Pie Face transaction, and the closing balance); (3) Mrs Mac’s’ directors were not personally responsible for the impugned conduct of Mr Markwart as their agent, nor were they knowingly involved in Mr Markwart’s misleading or deceptive conduct; and (4) Mrs Mac’s was a concurrent wrongdoer pursuant to s 87CB(1) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) responsible for 50% of Octet’s loss – the primary judge gave judgment for Octet against Mr Markwart for $37,779.46 plus pre-judgment interest and ordered that Mr Markwart pay 25% of Octet’s costs on the ordinary basis – whether the primary judge erred in holding: (1) that Mr Markwart had engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct; (2) that Mrs Mac’s was responsible for only 50% of Octet’s loss; and (3) that Mr Markwart should pay 25% of Octet’s costs – on Octet’s cross-appeal, whether the primary judge erred in his findings as to Octet’s loss and apportionment of liability to Mrs Mac’s.
Octet Finance Pty Ltd v Macgregor [2026] NSWSC 103
Submissions
30 September
2026/00322890
CORPORATIONS – Tahmoor Coal Pty Ltd (in liq) (Tahmoor) operates an underground coal mine located near Bargo, New South Wales (Tahmoor Mine) – on or around 20 April 2018, Tahmoor and Bargo Collieries Pty Ltd (collectively, the Companies) entered into a royalty deed with Glencore Coal Pty Ltd (Glencore), under which Tahmoor would pay Glencore a royalty on coal that it extracted from the Tahmoor Mine (Royalty Deed) – cl 5.1(a) of the Royalty Deed provided that the Companies must not, without the prior written consent of Glencore, “assign, novate, transfer, charge, encumber, create an interest in or over, or otherwise deal with their rights, title or interest in, or obligations with respect to” certain tenements and land, including tenements associated with the Tahmoor Mine – on 6 March 2026, the Companies entered liquidation, with Messrs Shaun Fraser and Jonathan Henry appointed as their liquidators (the Liquidators) – following the Companies’ entry into liquidation, the Tahmoor Mine was placed into the care and maintenance of the Liquidators – the Liquidators thereafter commenced a sale process in respect of the Tahmoor Mine as a going concern – on 2 April 2026, Glencore wrote to the Liquidators asserting its rights in respect of any breach of the Royalty Deed – on 1 May 2026, the Liquidators wrote to Glencore contending that the continuation of the Royalty Deed was contrary to the interests of the Companies’ creditors and was thus liable to be disclaimed – on 15 May 2026, the Liquidators and the Companies commenced proceedings seeking, amongst other things, a declaration that the Royalty Deed was an “unprofitable contract” within the meaning of s 568(1A) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act) or, alternatively, an order under that section granting the Liquidators and the Companies leave to disclaim the Royalty Deed – on 20 May 2026, following the commencement of proceedings, Glencore gave the Liquidators “pre-emptive consent” under cl 5.1 of the Royalty Deed for the acquisition of the Tahmoor Mine by a purchaser approved by the Liquidators – the primary judge relevantly held that the Royalty Deed was not an “unprofitable contract” because Glencore’s pre-emptive consent obviated any adverse consequences arising from compliance with the terms of the Royalty Deed – the primary judge further refused leave to the Liquidators to disclaim the Royalty Deed under s 568(1A) of the Corporations Act on the basis that a grant of leave would “defeat the rights that Glencore obtained in a proper commercial transaction”, would “potentially undermine commercial certainty in royalty arrangements”, and would constitute a “wealth transfer from Glencore to unsecured creditors” – whether the primary judge erred in failing to find that the Royalty Deed was an “unprofitable contract” within the meaning of s 568(1A) of the Corporations Act – whether the primary judge erred in refusing to grant the Liquidators leave to disclaim the Royalty Deed.
In the matter of Tahmoor Coal Pty Ltd (in liq) [2026] NSWSC 773
1 October 2026
TORTS (negligence) – by a statement of claim (later amended) filed on 16 September 2022, the appellant commenced proceedings against the respondent seeking damages for injury he suffered consequent to sexual assaults committed on him while he was a detainee in a juvenile detention centre (Mount Penang) on the Central Coast between 6 November 1996 and 10 January 1997 – the appellant alleged that the abuse occurred in and around a shower block attached to the detention centre gym – the claim was brought on the basis of three causes of action: in negligence, on the basis that the respondent breached its duty of care to avoid foreseeable but not insignificant risks of harm to the appellant; a non-delegable duty of care owed to the appellant by the respondent; and the vicarious liability of the respondent for the alleged abuse of the appellant – the respondent denied that any abuse had occurred as pleaded – the appellant’s case relied primarily on the evidence of the appellant given at trial – the primary judge found that the appellant did not establish that the pleaded abuse occurred and his Honour therefore dismissed the amended statement of claim – whether the primary judge engaged in an erroneous “methodology of fact-finding” and made various errors in the fact-finding exercise – whether the primary judge failed to give adequate reasons or failed to determine a “foundational fact” – whether the primary judge misapprehended or mischaracterised the appellant’s submissions.
Stanley v State of New South Wales [2025] NSWSC 1460
File number | Case name | Hearing date |
|---|---|---|
| 2026/00128746 | SmartChannel Pty Ltd v Area Ten Pty Ltd | 25/09/2026 |
| 2026/00109693 | Denise Hurley v Tweed Shire Council | 25/09/2026 |
| 2025/00396449 | FX Group Holdings Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Company Limited as trustee of the CPEC 8 Trust A (formerly the Champ IV Trust A) | 22/09/2026 |
| 2026/00134422 | SoClean Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue | 11/9/2026 |
| 2026/00113709 | Secretary, Department of Planning, Housing and Infrastructure v Andrew Thaler | 10/9/2026 |
| 2026/00205816 | Studio B Hair Design Trust v Kerrisons Legal Service | 8/9/2026 |
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