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2026/00091661
| Date | Party | Submission |
|---|---|---|
| 1/5/2026 | Appellant | Submissions (PDF, 664.2 KB) |
| 5/5/2026 | Appellant | Notice of Appeal (PDF, 612.7 KB) |
| 3/6/2026 | Respondent | Submissions (PDF, 645.9 KB) |
| 19/6/2026 | Appellant | Reply (PDF, 622.8 KB) |
| 25/6/2026 | Respondent | Certification for Publication (PDF, 482.5 KB) |
REAL PROPERTY – the appellant owns undeveloped land in Clifton, NSW (the Land) – the Land abuts the road reserve which forms part of Lawrence Hargrave Drive, that being a designated “main road” and therefore a “classified road” under the Roads Act 1993 (NSW) – between October 2022 and October 2023, the first respondent constructed Stage 2 of the Grand Pacific Walk, a planned 60 kilometre footpath/cycleway stretching along the coastline of the Wollongong Local Government Area – part of Stage 2 was constructed in the road reserve adjacent to the Land – the second respondent performs some functions with respect to Lawrence Hargrave Drive pursuant to an agreement with the first respondent and certain provisions of the Roads Act – on 24 June 2025, the appellant commenced proceedings seeking relief including an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the first and/or second respondents to grant the appellant access (whether on foot, in a vehicle or otherwise) to the boundary between the Land and Lawrence Hargrave Drive, in accordance with s 6 of the Roads Act – in the alternative, the appellant advanced a claim in nuisance against the respondents, and sought a mandatory injunction requiring them to provide such access – the appellant also sought declaratory relief – the appellant contended that s 6(1) entitled it to an unrestricted right of access to Lawrence Hargrave Drive from the Land – the respondents contended that the right of access provided in s 6(1) is, by virtue of s 6(2), able to be (and was in this case) restricted by the Roads Act – the primary judge held that the claim in nuisance against the first respondent was not made out – the primary judge accepted the respondents’ construction of s 6 and found that the work which it was alleged obstructed the right of access was carried out by the first respondent in accordance with all relevant laws, including development consent granted by first respondent and concurrence from the second respondent in accordance with s 138 of the Roads Act – the primary judge was not satisfied that any action was maintained by the appellant against the second respondent – the primary judge dismissed the proceedings against both respondents – whether the primary judge erred in construing s 6(2) of the Roads Act and applying s 138 as restricting or qualifying the right conferred by s 6(1).
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