




Filed: 26 May 2023 5:38 PM



D0001Q3XMO

Defence to Amended Statement of Claim

COURT DETAILS

| | |
|-------------|----------------------|
| Court | Supreme Court of NSW |
| Division | Common Law |
| List | Common Law General |
| Registry | Supreme Court Sydney |
| Case number | 2022/00214157 |

TITLE OF PROCEEDINGS

| | |
|-----------------|--------------------------|
| First Plaintiff | Raya Meredith |
| First Defendant | State of New South Wales |

FILING DETAILS

| | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Filed for | State of New South Wales, Defendant 1 |
| Legal representative | Nicholas Regener |
| Legal representative reference | |
| Telephone | 9233 7788 |
| Your reference | 224209:NSR:RTH |

ATTACHMENT DETAILS

In accordance with Part 3 of the UCPR, this coversheet confirms that both the Lodge Document, along with any other documents listed below, were filed by the Court.

Defence to Amended Statement of Claim (Meredith_2023.05.26 - Defence.pdf)

[attach.]

Form 7A (version 5)
UCPR 14.3

DEFENCE TO FURTHER AMENDED STATEMENT OF CLAIM

COURT DETAILS

| | |
|-------------|----------------------------------|
| Court | Supreme Court of New South Wales |
| Division | Common Law |
| List | General |
| Registry | Sydney |
| Case number | 2022/00214157 |

TITLE OF PROCEEDINGS

| | |
|-----------|---------------------------------|
| Plaintiff | RAYA MEREDITH |
| Defendant | STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES |

FILING DETAILS

| | |
|--------------------------------|---|
| Filed for | State of New South Wales , defendant |
| Legal representative | Nicholas Scott Regener Makinson d'Apice Lawyers |
| Legal representative reference | PCN: 51528 NSW Ref: 224209:NSR:RTH Court User No: 84 |
| Contact name and telephone | Rachelle Harrington Tel. 02 9233 7788 |
| Contact email | rharrington@makdap.com.au |

PLEADING AND PARTICULARS

In response to the [further amended](#) statement of claim filed ~~21 July 2022~~ [2 November 2022](#) ~~30 March 2023~~ ([FASOC](#)), the Defendant pleads as follows:

PARTIES

1. In response to paragraph 1 of the [FASOC](#), the Defendant:
 - (a) admits, in respect of the Plaintiff's claim, that Senior Constable Danielle George (**SC George**), Senior Constable David Jarnet (**SC Jarnet**) and Senior Constable Todd Petrie (**SC Petrie**) were members of the NSW Police Force as at 20 July 2018; and
 - (b) otherwise does not admit the paragraph.
2. In response to paragraph 2 of the [FASOC](#), the Defendant:
 - (a) admits, in respect of the Plaintiff's claim, that SC George, SC Jarnet and SC Petrie were, as at 20 July 2018, deemed to be persons in the service of the Crown pursuant to s 6 of the *Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983* (NSW); and
 - (b) otherwise does not admit the paragraph.
3. In response to paragraph 3 of the [FASOC](#), the Defendant:
 - (a) says, without any admission as to liability with respect to any cause of action pleaded, that it admits vicarious liability for the conduct of SC George, SC Jarnet and SC Petrie for the purpose of the provisions of Part 4 of the *Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983* (NSW) should the torts alleged in these proceedings be proved and for the purposes of these proceedings only;
 - (b) otherwise does not admit the paragraph.
4. The Defendant admits paragraph 4 of the [FASOC](#).

THE PLAINTIFF AND GROUP MEMBERS

5. The Defendant admits paragraph 5 of the [FASOC](#).
6. The Defendant admits paragraph 6 of the [FASOC](#).
7. In response to paragraph 7 of the [FASOC](#), the Defendant:
 - (a) admits the Plaintiff brings these proceedings on behalf of herself and group members;
 - (b) ~~[not used] says that paragraph 7.3.4 of the SOC is embarrassing and liable to be struck out on that basis;~~

- (c) otherwise does not admit the characteristics of “Group Members” pleaded in paragraphs 7.1, 7.2, 7.3.1, 7.3.2, 7.3.3 and 7.4;
- (d) says that the lawfulness of the alleged searches of group members described in paragraph 7.3 will turn on the specific facts of each individual group member’s case; and
- (e) says further that where the Defendant uses the term “strip search” in this defence it is not using the defined term “strip search” that appears in paragraph 7 of the [FASOC](#).

8. The Defendant does not admit paragraph 8 of the [FASOC](#).

9. The Defendant does not admit paragraph 9 of the [FASOC](#).

GROUP MEMBERS ALLEGED TO BE “VULNERABLE PEOPLE”

10. The Defendant does not admit paragraph 10 of the [FASOC](#).

ALLEGED FACTS

11. In response to paragraph 11 of the [FASOC](#), the Defendant:

- (a) admits the Plaintiff attended Splendour in the Grass on 20 July 2018; ~~and~~
- (b) [does not know if the Plaintiff attended other music festivals; and](#)
- (c) does not admit the paragraph in respect of group members.

12. The Defendant admits paragraph 12 of the [FASOC](#).

13. In response to paragraph 13 of the [FASOC](#), the Defendant:

- (a) says that the solicitors for the Plaintiff have indicated in correspondence that the chapeau of paragraph 13 of the SOC should read “The Plaintiff and ~~some or all of~~ the Group Members”, and so the Defendant pleads to this paragraph on that basis;

Particulars of (a)

- i. Letter from Slater + Gordon to Makinson d’Apice dated 26 August 2022 at [5].
 - (b) refers to and repeats paragraphs 19 – 68 of this defence below in respect of allegations made by the Plaintiff; and
 - (c) otherwise does not admit the paragraph.
14. In response to paragraph 14 of the [FASOC](#), the Defendant:
- (a) refers to and repeats paragraph 7(b)-(d) of this defence above;

- (b) refers to and repeats paragraphs 19 – 68 of this defence below in relation to the specific allegations made by the Plaintiff; and
 - (c) otherwise does not admit the paragraph.
15. In response to paragraph 15 of the [FASOC](#), the Defendant:
- (a) refers to and repeats paragraph 7(b)-(d) of this defence above;
 - (b) denies the paragraph in respect of the Plaintiff; and
 - (c) does not admit the paragraph in respect of group members.
16. In response to paragraph 16 of the [FASOC](#), the Defendant:
- (a) refers to and repeats paragraph 7(b)-(d) of this defence above;
 - (b) says that police are only required to comply with s 34A in the event of a consensual search;
 - (c) admits the Plaintiff did not consent to the strip search;
 - (d) says that s 34A of LEPRA is therefore of no application to the Plaintiff's claim; and
 - (e) does not admit the paragraph in respect of group members.
17. In response to paragraph 17 of the [FASOC](#), the Defendant:
- (a) refers to and repeats paragraph 7(b)-(d) of this defence above;
 - (b) refers to and repeats paragraphs 19 – 68 of this defence below in relation to the specific allegations made by the Plaintiff;
 - (c) denies that SC George's strip search of the Plaintiff did not comply with ss 32 and 202 of LEPRA; and
 - (d) does not admit the paragraph in respect of group members.
18. In response to paragraph 18 of the [FASOC](#), the Defendant:
- (a) refers to and repeats paragraph 7(b)-(d) of this defence above;
 - (b) refers to and repeats paragraphs 19 – ~~608~~ of this defence below in relation to the specific allegations made by the Plaintiff;
 - (c) denies that SC George's strip search of the Plaintiff did not comply with s 33 of LEPRA; and
 - (d) does not admit the paragraph in respect of group members.

ALLEGED CONDUCT IN RESPECT OF THE PLAINTIFF

19. The Defendant admits paragraph 19 of the [FASOC](#).

20. The Defendant admits paragraph 20 of the [FASOC](#).
21. The Defendant admits paragraph 21 of the [FASOC](#).
22. The Defendant admits paragraph 22 of the [FASOC](#).
23. The Defendant admits paragraph 23 of the [FASOC](#).
24. The Defendant admits paragraph 24 of the [FASOC](#).
25. In response to paragraph 25 of the [FASOC](#), the Defendant:
 - (a) admits the Plaintiff was approached by SC Jarnet handling a drug detection dog named Seeby;
 - (b) says that the Plaintiff was seeking to enter a public place at which a concert or other artistic performance, dance party or other entertainment was being held, within the meaning of s 148(1)(b) of LEPRA;
 - (c) in the alternative, says that the Plaintiff was seeking to enter part of a premises being used for the consumption of liquor that was sold at the premises (where the premises were not being used primarily as a restaurant or other dining place) within the meaning of s 148(1)(a) of LEPRA;
 - (d) in the further alternative, says that a warrant was sought and obtained for the drug dog operation under s 149 of LEPRA;
 - (e) says further that, in the premises, SC Jarnet was authorised pursuant to ss 147, 148(1) and/or 149 of LEPRA to use Seeby to carry out “general drug detection” within the meaning of s 145 of LEPRA; and
 - (f) otherwise does not admit the paragraph.
26. In response to paragraph 26 of the [FASOC](#), the Defendant:
 - (a) says that Seeby gave a positive indication that there was a prohibited substance in the airspace around the Plaintiff; and
 - (b) otherwise does not admit the paragraph.
27. In response to paragraph 27 of the [FASOC](#), the Defendant:
 - (a) admits that SC Jarnet spoke to the Plaintiff;
 - (b) says that SC Jarnet told the Plaintiff his name and place of duty;
 - (c) admits that the Plaintiff stopped walking towards the entrance;
 - (d) says that SC Jarnet was lawfully authorised to stop and detain the Plaintiff pursuant to s 21 of LEPRA because SC Jarnet suspected on reasonable grounds that the

Plaintiff had in her possession or under her control, in contravention of the *Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985*, a prohibited plant or prohibited drug;

Particulars of reasonable grounds

SC Jarnet's suspicion was based subjectively on the following matters, which also indicate the suspicion was reasonably held:

- i. The Plaintiff was at a large music festival in the mid north Coast of New South Wales, which was a geographic location associated with relatively common recreational drug use.
- ii. His awareness that a warrant had been granted permitting general drug dog detection at the music festival and that, typically, such warrants were granted after provision of police intelligence information including the history of drug detections at the particular festival in previous years.
- iii. Seeby gave a positive indication that there was a prohibited substance in the airspace around the Plaintiff.
- iv. His assessment of Seeby's reaction to the airspace around the Plaintiff, including the extent of Seeby's reaction and the location on the Plaintiff's person where (if anywhere) Seeby was the most focussed.
- v. His awareness that Seeby was an experienced drug detection dog who had passed the Drug Notice Course for new drug detection dogs with (then) Constable Jarnet in 2012, and her annual re-qualifications for each of the years thereafter, in addition to further training including training in in odour reinforcement and people screening (2013).
- vi. His prior experience working as a drug detection dog handler with Seeby for approximately 6 years prior to this event, including various music festivals.
- vii. His assessment of the Plaintiff's conduct on approaching the entrance.
- viii. His assessment of the Plaintiff's response to any questions he asked of her.
- ix. Further particulars may be supplied following the State's evidence.

- (e) says that SC Petrie also spoke to the Plaintiff;
- (f) says that SC Petrie was lawfully authorised to stop and detain the Plaintiff pursuant to s 21 of LEPRa because SC Petrie suspected on reasonable grounds that the Plaintiff had in her possession or under her control, in contravention of the *Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985*, a prohibited plant or prohibited drug;
- (g) says that, at some point, the Plaintiff said words to SC Jarnet and/or SC Petrie to the effect of “I had a smoke with a joint this morning”; and
- (h) otherwise denies the paragraph.

Particulars of reasonable grounds

SC Petrie’s suspicion was based subjectively on the following matters, which also indicate the suspicion was reasonably held:

- i. His prior police experience in drug detection.
- ii. The Plaintiff was at a music festival with a younger demographic, which, in his experience, was an environment where it was common for people to possess and supply prohibited drugs.
- iii. A drug dog gave a positive indication that there was a prohibited substance in the airspace around the Plaintiff.
- iv. The plaintiff said words to the effect of “I had a smoke with a joint this morning”.
- v. His assessment of the plaintiff’s demeanour, physical appearance, body language and answers to questions.
- vi. Information from the drug dog handler about the plaintiff’s interaction with police.
- vii. Information conveyed by way of pre-festival briefing regarding the use of drugs at the festival.
- viii. Further particulars may be supplied following the [service of the State’s evidence](#).

28. In response to paragraph 28 of the [FASOC](#), the Defendant:
- (a) denies that SC Jarnet directed the Plaintiff to the Police Inspection Area;
 - (b) says that SC Petrie directed the Plaintiff to the Police Inspection Area;
 - (c) says that police had erected a fence, that was approximately 2m high and covered with hessian sacking, around an area off to the side of the entrance to the Splendour Grounds (**Police Search Area**);
 - (d) says that the Police Search Area contained tents (**Tents**);
 - (e) says that the Tents were made of a thick and heavy tarpaulin-like material;
 - (f) says that the top and sides of Tents were enclosed;
 - (g) says that at one side of each Tent there was an opening or doorway that was capable of being opened and closed (**Entry Points**);
 - (h) says that the Entry Points of each Tent faced the inside of the Police Search Area; and
 - (i) otherwise denies the paragraph.
29. The Defendant denies paragraph 29 of the [FASOC](#).
30. In response to paragraph 30 of the [FASOC](#), the Defendant:
- (a) refers to and repeats paragraphs 28(c)-(h) and 29 of this defence above; and
 - (b) otherwise denies the paragraph.
31. In response to paragraph 31 of the [FASOC](#), the Defendant:
- (a) refers to and repeats paragraphs 28(c)-(h) of this defence above;
 - (b) admits that the Plaintiff went into the Police Search Area and, from there, was directed by SC George to go inside a Tent;
 - (c) says that, before the Plaintiff went into a Tent, she spoke with SC George;
 - (d) says that SC George told the Plaintiff her name, place of duty, and reasons for the exercise of the search power;
 - (e) says that SC George was lawfully authorised to stop, search and detain the Plaintiff pursuant to s 21 of LEPPRA because SC George suspected on reasonable grounds that the Plaintiff had in her possession or under her control, in contravention of the *Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985*, a prohibited plant or prohibited drug; and

Particulars of reasonable grounds

SC George's suspicion was based subjectively on the following matters, which also indicate the suspicion was reasonably held:

- i. Her own prior experience working at music festivals and in general duties, searching people on the basis they were suspected to have prohibited drugs in their possession or under their control.
- ii. That the plaintiff was at a music festival known for supply and possess offences and attracting a younger demographic which, in SC George's experience, attracted drugs of several different kinds, including pills, cannabis, cookies and LSD.
- iii. That a drug dog had given a positive indication that there was a prohibited substance in the airspace around the plaintiff.
- iv. Information supplied by other officers who had interacted with the plaintiff, including the officers' observations, the plaintiff's demeanour and behaviour, and any words spoken.
- v. Her assessment of the plaintiff's demeanour, physical appearance, body language and answers to questions while they spoke outside the Tent.
- vi. Further particulars may be supplied following the State's evidence.

(f) otherwise denies the paragraph.

32. In response to paragraph 32 of the [FASOC](#), the Defendant:

- (a) does not admit the Plaintiff was directed to hand over her bag to a Police Officer; and
- (b) otherwise denies the paragraph.

33. In response to paragraph 33 of the [FASOC](#), the Defendant:

- (a) refers to and repeats paragraphs 31(b), (c) and (d) above;
- (b) denies (to the extent it may be alleged in this paragraph) that the Plaintiff's first interaction with SC George was inside the Tent; and
- (c) otherwise admits the paragraph.

34. The Defendant admits paragraph 34 of the [FASOC](#), save that it says these words were spoken earlier and outside the Tent, rather than inside the Tent.

35. The Defendant does not admit paragraph 35 of the [FASOC](#).

36. The Defendant admits paragraph 36 of the [FASOC](#).
37. In response to paragraph 37 of the [FASOC](#), the Defendant:
- (a) says that, in conducting an ordinary search of the Plaintiff, SC George quickly ran her hands over the Plaintiff's outer clothing in accordance with s 30(a) of LEPR; and
 - (b) denies that SC George ran her hands over the Plaintiff's skin.
38. In response to paragraph 38 of the [FASOC](#), the Defendant:
- (a) says that SC George was lawfully authorised to ask the Plaintiff to remove her shoes pursuant to s 30(b) of LEPR; and
 - (b) otherwise does not admit the paragraph.
39. In response to paragraphs 39 to 53 of the [FASOC](#), the Defendant:
- (a) says that SC George was lawfully authorised to carry out a strip search of the Plaintiff pursuant to s 31(b) of LEPR because SC George suspected on reasonable grounds that a strip search was necessary for the purposes of the search and that the seriousness and urgency of the circumstances made the strip search necessary;

Particulars of reasonable grounds

SC George's suspicion that a strip search was necessary for the purposes of the search was based subjectively on the following matters, which also indicate the suspicion was reasonably held:

- i. The ordinary search had not yielded any prohibited drugs in circumstances where SC George had formed the view, based on the matters set out in the particulars to paragraph 31 above, the plaintiff's behaviour during the ordinary search, any further admissions made by during the ordinary search, and/or where on the plaintiff the drug dog had indicated, that the plaintiff was likely to have drugs in her possession.
- ii. Her assessment of the extent to which the plaintiff's clothing or hairstyle would allow for a prohibited drug to be concealed even during an ordinary search.
- iii. Further particulars may be supplied following the State's evidence.

Particulars of seriousness and urgency

SC George's suspicion that the seriousness and urgency of the circumstances made the strip search necessary was based, subjectively, on the following matters:

- i. The health risk to the plaintiff if she went on to ingest a prohibited drug.
- ii. The health risk to others if they ingested a prohibited drug brought into the festival by the plaintiff.
- iii. If SC George did not conduct a strip search of the plaintiff now, she would not have another opportunity to search the plaintiff before the plaintiff or someone else ingested any prohibited drug on the plaintiff's person, or the plaintiff disposed of any prohibited drug in a way posing risk to others (for instance, by dropping it on the ground).
- iv. If SC George did not conduct a strip search of the plaintiff now, there was a limited opportunity for other police to detect any prohibited drugs on the plaintiff once inside the festival, and/or before the plaintiff or someone else ingested any prohibited drug on the plaintiff's person, and/or before the plaintiff disposed of any prohibited drug in a way posing risk to others (for instance, by dropping it on the ground).

SC George's suspicion of seriousness and urgency was reasonably held on account of the following matters:

- v. The matters set out immediately above as to SC George's subjective state of mind.
- vi. The seriousness at law of certain offences for drug supply and/or possession.
- vii. History of recorded drug possession, use, supply and overdoses at the Splendour in the Grass festival in previous years.
- viii. Further particulars may be supplied following the State's evidence.

(b) does not admit paragraph 39; and

(c) responds specifically to paragraphs 40 to 53 as follows below.

40. The Defendant does not admit paragraph 40 of the [FASOC](#).

41. The Defendant does not admit paragraph 41 of the [FASOC](#).
42. The Defendant does not admit paragraph 42 of the [FASOC](#).
43. The Defendant does not admit paragraph 43 of the [FASOC](#).
44. The Defendant denies paragraph 44 of the [FASOC](#).
45. The Defendant does not admit paragraph 45 of the [FASOC](#).
46. The Defendant does not admit paragraph 46 of the [FASOC](#).
47. The Defendant denies paragraph 47 of the [FASOC](#).
48. The Defendant denies paragraph 48 of the [FASOC](#).
49. The Defendant denies paragraph 49 of the [FASOC](#).
50. The Defendant denies paragraph 50 of the [FASOC](#).
51. The Defendant denies paragraph 51 of the [FASOC](#).
52. The Defendant denies paragraph 52 of the [FASOC](#).
53. The Defendant does not admit paragraph 53 of the [FASOC](#).
54. The Defendant does not admit paragraph 54 of the [FASOC](#).
55. The Defendant denies paragraph 55 of the [FASOC](#).
56. In response to paragraph 56 of the [FASOC](#), the Defendant:
 - (a) refers to and repeats paragraph 28(c)-(i) of this defence above;
 - (b) denies that the Plaintiff was directed to provide her drivers' license to police;
 - (c) says that the Plaintiff was asked to provide, and voluntarily provided her name, address, date of birth and phone number to SC Petrie;
 - (d) otherwise does not admit the paragraph.
57. The Defendant does not admit paragraph 57 of the [FASOC](#).
58. The Defendant does not admit paragraph 58 of the [FASOC](#).
59. In response to paragraph 59 of the [FASOC](#), the Defendant:
 - (a) says that whether or not any drugs or other prohibited items were found on the Plaintiff as a result of the strip search is not relevant because it does not go towards establishing any pleaded cause of action; and
 - (b) ~~[not used] says the paragraph is therefore embarrassing and liable to be struck out; and~~

(c) ~~under cover of that objection,~~ otherwise admits the paragraph.

60. In response to paragraph 60 of the [FASOC](#), the Defendant:

(a) refers to and repeats paragraph 32 of this defence above;

(b) says that whether or not any drugs or other prohibited items were found in the Plaintiff's bag is not relevant because it does not go towards establishing any pleaded cause of action; and

(c) [not used] ~~says the paragraph is therefore embarrassing and liable to be struck out; and~~

(d) ~~under cover of that objection,~~ otherwise admits the paragraph.

ALLEGED ASSAULT AND BATTERY

61. In response to paragraph 61 of the [FASOC](#), the Defendant:

(a) denies that, if SC Jarnet is found to have tapped the Plaintiff on the shoulder, this constituted a battery;

(b) says that tapping someone on the shoulder to get that person's attention is a form of physical contact "utterly without fault" as part of the ordinary conduct of daily life;

(c) denies that the ordinary search performed by SC George constituted a battery on the basis that the touching was lawfully justified by s 21 of LEPR; and

(d) says that SC George used such force as was reasonably necessary to carry out the function of conducting an ordinary search in accordance with s 230 of LEPR.

62. The Defendant denies paragraph 62 of the [FASOC](#).

63. In response to paragraph 63 of the [FASOC](#), the Defendant:

(a) refers to and repeats paragraph 62 of this defence above; and

(b) otherwise does not admit whether the Plaintiff felt imminent fear.

ALLEGED FALSE IMPRISONMENT

64. The Defendant denies paragraph 64 of the [FASOC](#).

65. The Defendant denies paragraph 65 of the [FASOC](#).

66. The Defendant denies paragraph 66 of the [FASOC](#).

67. The Defendant does not admit paragraph 67 of the [FASOC](#).

68. The Defendant denies paragraph 68 of the [FASOC](#).

CONDUCT OF STATE RELEVANT TO EXEMPLARY DAMAGES

68A. The Defendant denies paragraph 68A of the FASOC. In further answer, the Defendant:

- (a) says that the words “most music festivals” and “substantial detachments” in paragraph 68A.1 and the words “primary means” in paragraph 68A.2 are embarrassing;
- (b) says, regarding those paragraphs and under cover of the above objection, that:
 - (i) New South Wales Police Force officers attended a number of music festivals in the period between 22 July 2026 to 21 July 2022 for the purpose of, among other things, minimising the risk of harms associated with the use of prohibited drugs by attendees;
 - (ii) to that end, police officers investigated whether festival attendees were in possession of prohibited drugs; and
 - (iii) sometimes, police officers conducted strip searches as part of those investigations;
- (c) says, in relation to 68A.3, that:
 - (i) the effect of undergoing a strip search varies from individual to individual;
 - (ii) depending on the circumstances, an individual may or may not suffer humiliation or a traumatic response; and
 - (iii) a strip search that is not carried out in accordance with LEPR may, depending on the circumstances, constitute an assault, battery or false imprisonment;
- (d) says, in relation to 68A.4, that:
 - (i) the paragraph employs concepts that are embarrassing (including “practice or pattern of conduct”, “as a matter of routine” and “not in circumstances lawfully justified by the provisions of LEPR...”) and require for their interpretation reference to be made to particularised matters including paragraphs 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the FASOC and certain reports by the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission (LECC) and the NSW Coroner, none of which specify, adequately or at all, the “practice or pattern of conduct” (etc.) in which the Defendant is alleged to have engaged; and
 - (ii) reference to the content of the LECC and inquest reports is embarrassing in any event.

68B. The Defendant denies paragraph 68B of the FASOC.

68C. The Defendant denies paragraph 68C of the FASOC.

68D. The Defendant denies paragraph 68D of the FASOC.

LOSS AND DAMAGE

69. In response to paragraph 69 of the FASOC, the Defendant:

- (a) says that the paragraph makes no allegations against the Defendant; and
- (b) otherwise does not admit the paragraph.

70. In response to paragraph 70 of the FASOC, the Defendant:

- (a) denies the paragraph in respect of the Plaintiff; and
- (b) does not admit the paragraph in respect of group members.

71. In response to paragraph 71 of the FASOC, the Defendant:

- (a) admits the Plaintiff makes these claims;
- (b) denies the Plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought or at all; and
- (c) does not admit the paragraph in respect of group members.

72. In response to paragraph 72 of the FASOC, the Defendant:

- (a) denies paragraphs 72.1, 72.2, 72.3 and 72.5 in respect of the Plaintiff;
- (b) does not admit paragraph 72.4 in respect of the Plaintiff; and
- (c) does not admit the paragraph in respect of group members.

73. In response to paragraph 73 of the FASOC, the Defendant:

- (a) denies the paragraph in respect of the Plaintiff; and
- (b) does not admit the paragraph in respect of group members.

~~74. In response to The Defendant denies paragraph 74 of the FASOC, the Defendant:~~

~~(a) denies the paragraph in respect of the Plaintiff; and~~

~~(b) does not admit the paragraph in respect of group members.~~

LIMITATION DEFENCE

Satisfaction of s 50A(1)

75. By the FASOC, the Plaintiff brings causes of action for damages in tort.

76. By the FASOC, the Plaintiff seeks general and aggravated damages for, amongst other things, allegedly suffering embarrassment, fear, loss of dignity, and humiliation (**Hurt Feelings**).

Particulars

- i. [FASOC](#) at [70], [72], [73], [73.3], [73.5], [73.8].
77. In the premises, to the extent the Plaintiff seeks damages for Hurt Feelings, the Plaintiff seeks damages that “relate to the ... personal injury of a person” within the meaning of s 11(1) of the *Limitation Act 1969* (NSW) (**Limitation Act**).
78. In the premises of paragraphs 75 to 77 above, to the extent the Plaintiff seeks damages for Hurt Feelings, s 50A(1) of the *Limitation Act* is satisfied.

Satisfaction of s 50A(2)

79. By the [FASOC](#), the Plaintiff alleges that the acts of police allegedly resulted in injury in the form of Hurt Feelings.

Particulars

- i. [FASOC](#) at [70], [72], [73.3], [73.5], [73.8].
80. In the premises, to the extent the Plaintiff alleges injury in the form of Hurt Feelings, the Plaintiff alleges “injury” within the meaning of s 50A(2) of the *Limitation Act*.
81. Division 6 of Part 2 of the *Limitation Act* commenced on 6 December 2002.

Particulars

- i. *Civil Liability (Amendment) Personal Responsibility Act 2002* (NSW), Sch 4.6 [5].
82. The alleged acts or omissions said to have resulted in injury in the form of Hurt Feelings occurred after the commencement of Division 6 of Part 2 of the *Limitation Act*.
83. In the premises of paragraphs 79 to 82 above, by operation of s 50A(2) of the *Limitation Act*, Division 6 of Part 2 of the *Limitation Act* applies to the Plaintiff’s claim.

Satisfaction of s 50C(1)(a)

84. On 20 July 2018, the Plaintiff knew or ought to have known the fact that the alleged injury in the form of Hurt Feelings had occurred.
85. On 20 July 2018, the Plaintiff knew or ought to have known the fact that the alleged injury in the form of Hurt Feelings was caused by the fault of the Defendant.
86. On 20 July 2018, the Plaintiff knew or ought to have known the fact that the alleged injury in the form of Hurt Feelings was sufficiently serious to justify the bringing of an action on the cause of action.
87. The Plaintiff’s action was brought by way of statement of claim filed on 21 July 2022.

88. In the premises, the Plaintiff's action on causes of action alleged to have resulted in injury in the form of Hurt Feelings was brought after the period of 3 years running from and including the date on which the causes of action were "discoverable" by the Plaintiff within the meaning of ss 50C and 50D of the *Limitation Act*.
89. In the premises, due to the operation of s 50C(1) of the *Limitation Act*, to the extent the Plaintiff seeks damages for injury in the form of Hurt Feelings, those actions are not maintainable.

In respect of group members

90. The Defendant says further that it relies on ss 50A, 50C and 50D of the *Limitation Act* in respect of other group members who have brought their claim more than 3 years running from and including the date on which their causes of action were "discoverable" within the meaning of ss 50C and 50D of the *Limitation Act*.

DEFENCE BASED ON SECTION 43A OF CIVIL LIABILITY ACT 2002 (NSW)

SC George

91. At all material times on 20 July 2018, SC George was working as a police officer with public official functions or was acting in a public official capacity.
92. In the premises, at all material times, SC George was a "public or other authority" within the meaning of ss 41(e1) and 43A(1) of the CLA.
93. SC George's powers to stop, search, strip search and detain the Plaintiff were powers conferred by or under LEPRA, within the meaning of s 43A(2)(a) of the CLA.
94. SC George's powers to stop, search, strip search and detain the Plaintiff were powers of a kind that persons generally are not authorised to exercise without specific statutory authority, within the meaning of s 43A(2)(b) of the CLA.
95. In the premises, SC George's powers to stop, search, strip search and detain the Plaintiff were a "special statutory power" conferred on SC George within the meaning of ss 43A(1) and (2) of the CLA.
96. SC George's stop, search, strip search and detention of the Plaintiff were not so unreasonable that no authority having the special statutory power in question could properly consider the stop, search, strip search and detention to have been a reasonable exercise of those powers.
97. In the premises, to the extent that the alleged liability of the Defendant is based upon SC George's alleged exercise of, or failure to exercise, a special statutory power conferred on her, that does not give rise to civil liability by operation of s 43A(3) of the CLA.

SC Jarnet

98. At all material times on 20 July 2018, SC Jarnet was working as a police officer with public official functions or was acting in a public official capacity.
99. In the premises, at all material times, SC Jarnet was a “public or other authority” within the meaning of ss 41(e1) and 43A(1) of the CLA.
100. SC Jarnet’s powers to use a dog to carry out general drug detection, and to stop and detain the Plaintiff, were powers conferred by or under LEPRA, within the meaning of s 43A(2)(a) of the CLA.
101. SC Jarnet’s powers to use a dog to carry out general drug detection, and to stop and detain the Plaintiff, were powers of a kind that persons generally are not authorised to exercise without specific statutory authority, within the meaning of s 43A(2)(b) of the CLA.
102. In the premises, SC Jarnet’s powers to use a dog to carry out general drug detection, and to stop and detain the Plaintiff, were “special statutory powers” conferred on SC Jarnet within the meaning of ss 43A(1) and (2) of the CLA.
103. SC Jarnet’s use of a dog to carry out general drug detection, and his stop and detention of the Plaintiff, were not so unreasonable that no authority having the special statutory power in question could properly consider his use of the dog to carry out general drug detection, or his stop and detention of the Plaintiff, to have been a reasonable exercise of those powers.
104. In the premises, to the extent that the alleged liability of the Defendant is based upon SC Jarnet’s alleged exercise of, or failure to exercise, a special statutory power conferred on him, that does not give rise to civil liability by operation of s 43A(3) of the CLA.

SC Petrie

105. At all material times on 20 July 2018, SC Petrie was working as a police officer with public official functions or was acting in a public official capacity.
106. In the premises, at all material times, SC Petrie was a “public or other authority” within the meaning of ss 41(e1) and 43A(1) of the CLA.
107. SC Petrie’s powers to stop and detain the Plaintiff were powers conferred by or under LEPRA, within the meaning of s 43A(2)(a) of the CLA.
108. SC Petrie’s powers to stop and detain the Plaintiff were powers of a kind that persons generally are not authorised to exercise without specific statutory authority, within the meaning of s 43A(2)(b) of the CLA.

109. In the premises, SC Petrie’s powers to stop and detain the Plaintiff were “special statutory powers” conferred on SC Petrie within the meaning of ss 43A(1) and (2) of the CLA.
110. SC Petrie’s stop and detention of the Plaintiff were not so unreasonable that no authority having the special statutory power in question could properly consider the stop and detention to have been a reasonable exercise of those powers.
111. In the premises, to the extent that the alleged liability of the Defendant is based upon SC Petrie’s alleged exercise of, or failure to exercise, a special statutory power conferred on him, that does not give rise to civil liability by operation of s 43A(3) of the CLA.

In respect of group members

112. The Defendant says further that it relies on s 43A of the CLA in respect of other group members to the extent that those group members allege that the liability of the Defendant is based upon a police officer’s exercise of, or failure to exercise, a special statutory power conferred on that officer.

SIGNATURE OF LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE

I certify under clause 4 of Schedule 2 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 that there are reasonable grounds for believing on the basis of provable facts and a reasonably arguable view of the law that the defence to the claim for damages in these proceedings has reasonable prospects of success.



Signature

Capacity

Date of signature

Solicitor on record

26 May 2023